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Competition law is fun. As a noted expert consultant told one of us: ‘Don’t tell my 
spouse, but I’d work on these cases for the sheer joy of it’. The facts, the issues, the 
window into economies and legal systems - it does not get much better than this. 
Not surprisingly, then, competition law academic seminars are also fun. At their best, 
they present opportunities for energized students to engage with scholars and wrestle 
with cutting edge issues in this particularly interesting field.  
Each of the two authors of this Editorial recently had the opportunity to participate in 
such seminars on the less familiar side of the Atlantic. One of us is an American 
academic who has been teaching classes and participating in seminars in Ireland; one of 
us is an early career European academic who is currently researching and teaching in 
the United States. 
The striking point, for both of us, is how different the experiences are. With all the talk 
about convergence of competition approaches, one might expect that the educational 
experiences would have harmonized. But they have not. This Editorial reflects on the 
differences we observed, implications from those differences for competition systems 
more generally, and the contributions of the four papers in this Special Issue. 
This Issue itself is the principal written output of the Sixth Annual Postgraduate 
Workshop organized by the PhD community in the University College Dublin (UCD) 
School of Law. The Workshop was held on 22 March 2012 and it focused on 
competition law enforcement.1 It brought together doctoral students from nine 
countries. No country accounted for more than two students. The discussants and chair 
persons came from or represented seven countries.2  
                                                                                                                                         
*  Member of the Irish Competition Authority; Professor of Law (on leave), Wayne State University, Detroit; 
and Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies, Loyola University Chicago; previously 
PhD Candidate and Ad Astra Scholar, University College Dublin School of Law. The views expressed herein 
are individual views and are not the views of the Competition Authority. 
1  The Workshop was organised by Jocelyn Delatre, Anna-Louise Hinds, Marek Martyniszyn, and Yichen Yang. 
It benefited from the help of Alan Greene, Joanne O'Toole Byrne, and Kamil Piszczek, and the support of 
UCD School of Law Faculty. The event was generously funded by the European Commission 
Representation in Dublin, UCD Newman Fund, and UCD School of Law. The agenda is available at 
http://www.ucd.ie/law/phdworkshop/thesixthannualpostgraduateworkshop/. The participants had an 
opportunity to submit their revised papers for consideration of publication in this Special Issue. The 
Workshop organisers are grateful to the Editors of the Competition Law Review and the anonymous referees 
for their constructive collaboration and support. 
2  Workshop organizers would like to thank Anca D. Chirita (University of Durham), Fiona De Londras (then 
UCD, currently University of Durham), Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou (University of Surrey), Jonathan Galloway 
(Newcastle University), Imelda Maher (UCD), Lorenzo F. Pace (Università Europea di Roma), Sebastian 
Editorial – Both Sides Now 
  (2012) 8(3) CompLRev 218 
Almost inevitably, papers examined and drew lessons from the legal systems of multiple 
countries - the papers printed here, for instance, include detailed discussion of the law 
and procedure of Poland and of Serbia, but other papers looked at other countries’ 
systems. This is not at all unusual given the routine way that students study in ‘foreign’ 
countries in Europe. But it means that comparative law is a given rather than the 
exception. Not so in the US, where most antitrust courses and seminars are taught by 
and for Americans. 
Another contrast is that in European seminars so much more is new. Ironically, it is the 
‘new world’ that is old. The Sherman Act dates from 1890, the Clayton and FTC Acts 
from 1914. European Union competition law dates from 1957, and the basic structure 
of enforcement was substantially changed by the Modernization Regulation, EU 
Council Regulation 1/2003, which called for decentralized enforcement by the national 
competition authorities and national courts. Even as we write, major changes are being 
made with respect to private enforcement. Students grapple with big issues and exciting 
questions. So much is undecided - whether policy decisions, or procedural questions, or 
philosophical questions about what most to value and what trade-offs to make. 
Students can confront one big question after another. In the US, well, not everything is 
settled, but there is no long list of big questions calling for attention. As an academic 
friend told one of us, the profit-maximizing American academic interested in earning 
tenure3 is well advised to emphasize fields other than competition law. 
Two things appear to be missing, so to speak, from European seminars. First, it is 
striking the extent to which law and economics - whether ‘Chicago law and economics’ 
or ‘post-Chicago law and economics’ - is deemphasized. Economics is central to US 
antitrust analysis;4 in Europe it matters, but less so.5 Although the situation is changing, 
                                                                                                                                         
Peyer (Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia), Oana Stefan (HEC), as well as Colin Scott 
(UCD Dean of Law). Stephen Calkins - the lead author of this Editorial - took part in the entire event and 
delivered the keynote. 
3  Kingman Brewster - to whom we refer not as the eminent antitrust scholar who first proposed a 
jurisdictional rule of reason, but as a president of Yale University - encapsulated tenure’s essence in the US 
system by stating that it is ‘for all normal purposes a guarantee of appointment until retirement age.’ 
Kingman Brewster, ‘On Tenure’, 58(4) American Association of University Professors Bulletin 381 (1972). 
4  See, e.g., Douglas H. Ginsburg and Eric M. Fraser, The Role of Economic Analysis in Competition Law, in Ian 
McEwin (ed), Getting the Balance Right: Intellectual Property, Competition Law and Economics in Asia 
(Hart Publishing, forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1610189. 
5  Some time ago and before the modernization process Eleanor Fox observed that ‘while economics has a role 
in EU analysis, it is much less center stage than in the United States’, EM Fox, US and EU Competition Law: A 
Comparison, in Edward M. Graham and J. David Richardston (eds.), Global Competition Policy (Peterson 
Institute, 1997), at 340. Since then the role of economics in the EU competition regime has been growing. 
For example, in 2003 the office and the team of the Chief Competition Economist was created in the DG 
Competition and economics had become embedded in EU competition policy. William Kovacic more 
recently observed that ‘to the extent that economists’ perspectives become reflected more expansively in the 
work of DG Comp, as one predicts they will over time, the analytical approach that the Commission takes in 
deciding whether to bring cases probably will converge more closely upon the approach that the DOJ and 
the FTC take’. William E Kovacic, Competition Policy in the European Union and the United State: Convergence or 
Divergence in the Future Treatment of Dominant Firms?, Competition Policy International Oct 2008, at 14. For the 
view from the European Commission see Alexander Italianer, The Interplay between Law and Economics, Opening 
Address at the Charles River Associates Annual Conference (2010), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2010_09_en.pdf. 
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fewer competition lawyers are trained in economics; economics is less important in the 
materials that are studied; more attention is given to matters not even implicitly 
economic. It is not that economics does not matter - it does - it just matters less and 
there is less cross-fertilization.6 
Second, what European students miss is the real heart of US antitrust law: private 
litigation. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that US antitrust law is private litigation. 
Just look at recent Supreme Court decisions: American Needle, Inc. v. NFL,7 Pacific Bell 
Telephone Co. v. Linkline Communications, Inc.;8 Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, 
Inc.;9 Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing;10 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly;11 
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co.;12 Illinois Tool Works Inc. v 
Independent Ink, Inc.;13 Texaco Inc. v. Dagher;14 Volvo Trucks North America, Inc. v. Reeder-
Simco GMC, Inc.;15 F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A.;16 United States Postal Service 
v. Flamingo Industries (USA) Ltd.;17 Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. 
Trinko;18 California Dental Ass’n v. FTC.19 That’s right – one needs to go back to 1999 to 
find a Supreme Court antitrust case in which a government agency was a party. Four 
Justices - Roberts, Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan - heard their first Supreme Court 
antitrust case in which the Government was a party only last November.20 And yet the 
Supreme Court obviously continues to decide antitrust cases. 
Private litigation provides continued grist for the antitrust academic mill. When do 
information exchanges become unlawful? See the learning from Cason-Merendo v. Detroit 
Medical Center.21 What practices fall within the per se ban on price fixing? See In re: Sulfuric 
                                                                                                                                         
6  This seems to apply also to Academia. For example, Mathias Siems looked at journals in which UK 
academics (all academics, not just competition ones) publish, drawing data from the 2008 Research 
Assessment Exercise (RAE). He compared journal information for law with other disciplines to identify 
‘closeness’ between law and other academic disciplines. Among eight categories Siems listed, economics was 
at the bottom, showing that in the UK legal scholars - in general - hardly ever publish in economics journals 
and economists rarely publish in legal journals. See Mathias Siems, ‘How close is ‘law’ to other academic 
disciplines?’, Siemslegal, 16 June 2012, available at http://siemslegal.blogspot.com/2012/06/how-close-is-
law-to-other-academic.html. 
7  130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010)  
8  555 U.S. 438 (2009). 
9  551 U.S. 877 (2007) (5-4). 
10  551 U.S. 264 (2007). 
11  550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
12  549 U.S. 312 (2007). 
13  126. S.Ct. 1281 (2006). 
14  547 U.S. 1 (2006). 
15  126 S. Ct. 860 (2006). 
16  542 U.S. 155 (2004). 
17  540 U.S. 736 (2004). 
18  540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
19  526 U.S. 756 (1999). 
20  See FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc., Dkt. No. 11-1160 (argued Nov. 26, 2012).  
21  ED Mi March 22, 2012. 
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Acid Antitrust Litig.22 What more than conscious parallelism is needed for a plaintiff to 
withstand a motion for summary judgment? See Superior Offshore Int’l v. Bristow Group.23 
And so on. It is a fundamentally different enterprise to write about government 
agencies (and, to some extent, court review of same) than about a mix of government 
action, court review, and, to a predominant extent, court decisions flowing from private 
litigation. 
This is not just a question of the source of the ‘law’ that is being studied. The US legal 
system is compelled to craft legal standards suitable for being applied by generalist 
judges (and sometimes juries) in cases brought by self-interested private participants.24 
Thus, the Supreme Court’s critically-important standards for granting motions to 
dismiss and motions for summary judgment are crafted in the shadow - nay, the spectre 
- of perceptions of discovery abuses and fears that litigation risks and expenses will 
force defendants to settle rather than resist frivolous cases. See, e.g., Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly (‘the threat of discovery expense will push cost-conscious defendants to settle 
even anemic cases’).25 
The papers in this Special Issue epitomize some of the strengths of European seminars. 
And, not surprisingly, they illustrate some of the differences between US and European 
offerings. 
Valerie Demedts offers an appealing overview of the key issues raised by international 
cooperation: multilateral vs. bilateral; convergence vs. cooperation; hard vs. soft law; 
formal vs. informal cooperation. She also provides a nice survey of the various means 
of bilateral cooperation, and then ends with the important point that ‘EU competition 
policy does not constitute a goal in itself, but serves a wide range of goals in order to 
strengthen and optimize the internal market’. Her paper is especially timely, since the 
ICN and OECD have only recently been surveying international enforcement 
cooperation.26  
Ironically, Demedts fails to discuss one of the principal tools for international 
cooperation: seminars such as the one in which she participated. Cooperation is 
particularly likely when cross-border friendships, based on mutual understanding and 
respect, facilitate quick emails and telephone calls. One is much more likely to bounce 
ideas off, or seek research leads from, someone one knows. So also, reaching out is 
more likely when there are shared understandings of legal systems. One of the special 
contributions of the OECD and the ICN is the bringing of people from different 
countries together, but that role can be performed perhaps even more effectively 
through education.  
                                                                                                                                         
22  Nos. 12-1109, 12-1224 (7th Cir. Dec. 27, 2012) (Posner, J.). 
23  3d Cir. July 27, 2012. 
24  Stephen Calkins, ‘The October 1992 Supreme Court Term and Antitrust: More Objectivity Than Ever’, 62 
Antitrust L.J. 327 (1994). 
25  550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007). 
26  See http://www.oecd.org/competition/globalforum/programmeanddocuments.htm#S3. 
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Maciej Bernatt makes the important observation that nominal substantive convergence 
may conceal the very substantial differences that flow from procedural differences. 
Bernatt points out - using especially the example of Poland - that sharp differences in 
procedure can exist notwithstanding the close cooperation made possible and 
encouraged by the European Competition Network. One of the important 
developments in recent years has been the application, and concerns about the possible 
application, of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and Bernatt does a nice job of 
illustrating how this development offers the promise that procedural harmonization 
may follow substantive. There is no question but that seeming substantive harmony can 
mask sharp difference based on different procedures. 
Pieter Van Cleynenbreugel’s paper makes a good pairing with Bernatt’s, since it too 
looks at procedure as well as substance. Although it might seem surprising that 
decentralization of enforcement of EU competition law would be a powerful tool for 
harmonization, Van Cleynenbreugel explains why that result was almost inevitable. 
Now, he argues, ‘competition law enforcement should no longer be assessed solely 
from the vantage points of efficiency and justice, it should also reflect an inherent set of 
engineering principles that shape and reshape the institutional architecture as an end in 
itself’. This is because ‘[a]rchitecture is a kind of law: it determines what people can and 
cannot do’. Van Cleynenbreugel closes by focusing on the courts’ important role in 
conferring legitimacy. 
Courts are seen not only as conferring legitimacy, but as the essential engine of change, 
by Velimir Zivkovic. The Serbian Commission for the Protection of Competition 
(‘CPC’) has, he says, ‘failed to produce any tangible results in practice, let alone 
promote the idea of competition’. Zivkovic observes that ‘the culture of competition, is 
unfortunately not something that can be created merely by enacting laws’. The solution, 
he says, lies in private enforcement: ‘It is the author’s first-hand experience that, as in 
many other professions, the economic situation of Serbian attorneys is generally far 
from prosperous and additional avenues to gain income would surely be welcomed’. 
Not easy, he concedes, but with the active amicus support of the CPC, the courts offer 
what is seen as perhaps the best hope of progress. 
Thus we end this tour of European scholarship with an invocation of one of the central 
features of US antitrust - and one of the key differences between EU and US 
educational offerings. Ironically, it is because of another of the differences - that so 
much of EU competition law is new - that it is easy to imagine evolutionary changes 
that could lead to still greater harmonization. 
 
